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Abstract
Divination —the consultation of an oracle in or-
der to determine a course for future action— has 
long been considered a practice characteristic of 
“primitive mentality.” We describe research with 
the babalawo of Santería, who are expert in the 
divinatory system of Ifá. Our first goal is to offer 
an example of what Vygotsky called “concrete 
psychology”: the study of particular systems of 
psychological functions in the concrete circum-
stances of specific professional complexes. Our 
second goal is to explore the character of divina-
tion as psychological and social process, given the 
somewhat negative views of divination expressed 
by many social scientists, including Lévy-Bruhl 
and Vygotsky himself. Analysis of a recorded 
consultation identified features characteristic of 
institutional discourse. We argue that the ins-
titutional facts of divination may constitute an 
unfamiliar ontology, but the epistemology —the 
appeal to logic and to empirical evidence— is a 
familiar one.
Keywords: cultural psychology, higher psycho-
logical functions, Lev Vygotsky, divination, con-
crete psychology, argumentation.
Resumen
La adivinación —consulta de un oráculo con el 
fin de determinar acciones futuras— se ha consi-
derado una práctica característica de la “menta-
lidad primitiva”. A continuación se presenta una 
investigación con los babalawos de la santería: 
los expertos en el sistema de adivinación de Ifá. 
El primer objetivo fue dar un ejemplo de lo que 
Vygotsky llamó “psicología concreta”: el estudio 
de sistemas de funciones psicológicas particu-
lares dentro de las circunstancias concretas de 
complejos profesionales específicos. El segundo 
objetivo fue explorar la adivinación como pro-
ceso psicológico y social, examinando las no-
ciones, un tanto negativas, que han expresado 
algunos científicos sociales sobre este concepto, 
incluyendo a Lévy-Bruhl y al mismo Vygotsky. 
Algunos rasgos característicos del discurso ins-
titucional se identificaron a través del análisis 
de registros de audio de consultas al oráculo 
por parte de los autores. En este trabajo se argu-
mentó que los aspectos institucionales de la adi-
vinación pueden constituir una ontología poco 
común, pero una epistemología familiar.
Palabras clave: psicología cultural, funciones 
psicológicas superiores, Lev Vygotsky, adivina-
ción, psicología concreta, argumentación. 
Resumo
A adivinhação —consulta de um oráculo com 
o fim de determinar ações futuras— tem sido 
considerada uma prática característica da “men-
talidade primitiva”. A continuação, apresenta-se 
uma pesquisa com os babalawos da santería: 
os especialistas no sistema de adivinhação de 
Ifá. O primeiro objetivo foi dar um exemplo do 
que Vygotsky chamou “psicologia concreta”: o 
estudo de sistemas de funções psicológicas par-
ticulares dentro das circunstâncias concretas de 
complexos profissionais específicos. O segundo 
objetivo foi explorar a adivinhação como proces-
so psicológico e social, examinando as noções, 
um tanto negativas, que têm expressado alguns 
científicos sociais sobre esse conceito, incluin-
do Lévy-Bruhl e o próprio Vygotsky. Alguns 
traços característicos do discurso institucional 
se identificaram por meio da análise de registros 
de áudio de consultas ao oráculo por parte dos 
autores. Neste trabalho, argumentou-se que os 
aspectos institucionais da adivinhação podem 
constituir uma ontologia pouco comum, mas 
uma epistemologia familiar.
Palavras-chave: psicologia cultural, funções psi-
cológicas superiores, Lev Vygotsky, adivinhação, 
psicologia concreta, argumentação. 356
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 “My history of cultural develop-
ment is an abstract treatment of concre-
te psychology.” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 68)
The writing of Lev Vygotsky has be-
come increasing influential in many countries 
around the world. It is now well-known that Vy-
gotsky proposed a revolutionary psychology that 
would overcome dualism, in the study of con-
sciousness as a material process. He viewed con-
sciousness as our relationship to the world, and 
argued that the various psychological functions 
work together as a dynamic system. He insisted 
that this system ought to be studied as a whole, 
rather than divided into separate components 
as is typically done in psychological research. 
Psychology should study the “real personality” 
as a unity, rather than traits or characteristics, 
a unity always located in what Vygotsky called 
“the social situation of development.” 
What is less well-known is that in his note-
books, unpublished until recently, Vygotsky an-
ticipated a “concrete psychology” which would 
move beyond the abstract conceptualization of 
human psychological functioning to undertake 
detailed investigations of specific ways of be-
ing human (Vygotsky, 1986). He complained, 
or confessed, to himself that his psychology re-
mained abstract in its treatment. One might say, 
though he didn’t use these words himself, that 
his psychology was still at a phase of develop-
ment where it simply described the generic 
person. He wrote that “My history of cultural 
development is an abstract treatment of concrete 
psychology” (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 68). In a con-
crete psychology, in contrast, the holistic model 
of personality would be related to the real life of 
specific persons, or specific kinds of person, in 
specific circumstances. Vygotsky proposed that 
considered concretely the higher psychological 
functions can continually “change their role,” so 
that “there is no permanent hierarchy” among 
them but rather “a sphere of possible roles” that 
each function can play, varying in “different 
spheres of social life.” The task, then, would 
be to study how the professional complex of a 
Moscow worker is structured, for example. Vy-
gotsky (1986) proposed that such investigation 
would explore “the different spheres of behavior 
(professional complex, etc.), the structure and 
the hierarchy of functions where they relate to 
and clash with one another” (p. 70). Evidently 
this would be the study of specific individuals in 
their particular practices, but in his short notes 
Vygotsky merely sketched the outline of a con-
crete psychology. It is necessary to fill in many 
of the details.
In this article we will describe our own ef-
forts to study personality in this sense of a fluid 
configuration of higher psychological functions 
in a social environment. We will describe our 
empirical exploration of the “living, specific psy-
chology” (Bozhovich, 2009, p. 37) of a particular 
professional complex –that of a babalawo, the 
priest of Ifá divination in the syncretic religion 
of Santería. We have two goals. The first is to 
clarify the character of a concrete psychology, 
and to contribute to the various lines of work 
that in recent years have taken psychology into 
the “wild” (cf. Cole, 1995; Hutchins, 1995; Lave, 
1991). The second is to explore the nature of 
the verbal reasoning that occurs in divination, 
given the somewhat negative views expressed 
by Vygotsky himself on this relationship, and 
the equally negative views of other social sci-
entists. We shall describe the practice of divina-
tion in the context of a session of consultation. 
Our analysis of this consultation demonstrates 
features characteristic of institutional discourse, 
frequent reported speech, and “reading” of the 
client, with assertions and questions that pre-
sume prior knowledge. Much of the interaction 
is oriented to predictions, prophesies, and the 
giving of advice, and the latter takes the form of 
what we argue is reasoned argument, with clear-
ly stated claims, warrants and grounding.
We have argued elsewhere that there are par-
allels between Vygotsky’s project and Foucault’s 357
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notion of a “historical ontology of ourselves” 
(Foucault, 1993; Packer, 2008), and it is relevant 
to sketch these parallels briefly. For both Vy-
gotsky and Foucault, thought is not individual 
mental representation, because human cognition 
is grounded in embodied practical activity, his-
torically constituted and socially distributed. For 
both, ontogenesis involves ontological change: 
the person is a product of the social, and (in Fou-
cault’s terms) power is folded to form the self or 
(in Vygotsky’s terms) self-mastery is necessary 
for the personality to become a system of higher 
psychological functions. Both conducted studies 
of “constitution”: the relation of mutual formation 
between person and form of life (Packer, 2010). 
We can see these parallels in operation in the 
overlaps between research on occupational per-
sonalities such as waitress (Rose, 2001), bartender 
(Beach, 1993), and factory worker (Scribner, 1985) 
within the framework of cultural psychology, and 
studies of, for example, Indian ascetics the Jain 
(Laidlaw, 2005) within a Foucauldian framework. 
We shall argue that Ifá divination is an occasion 
of constitution, though of the client as much as 
the babalawo.
Divination and “Primitive Mentality”
Divination has long been viewed as a key 
component of primitive mentality. Lévy-Bruhl’s 
analysis of La Mentalité Primitive (1922/1923) led 
him to the conclusion that:
 “The mind of the ‘primitive’ has hardly any room 
for such questions as ‘how’ or ‘why?’” “Myths, 
funeral rites, agrarian practices, and the exercise 
of magic do not appear to originate in the desire 
for a rational explanation; they are the primiti-
ves’ response to collective needs and sentiments 
which are profound and mighty and of compul-
sion” (Levy-Bruhl, 1910/1925, p. 25).
In Lévy-Bruhl’s account, one of the “most 
important components of the primitive’s mental 
experience” (1910/1926, p. 122), and one of the 
central aspects of mythical mentality, was the 
use of dreams for divination. He described how 
for “the South African races” dreams assisted in 
contact with the dead. He recounted not one but 
three dreams of Kaffirs1. Here is the second, the 
most straightforward of the three:
A man dreams that an attempt has been made to 
take his life by one whom he has always regarded 
as his true friend. On awakening he says: “This 
is strange; a man who never stoops to meanness 
wishes to destroy me. I cannot understand it, but 
it must be true, for ‘dreams never lie.’” Although 
the suspected friend protests his innocence, he 
immediately cuts his acquaintance (p. 108)
Lévy-Bruhl explained that this unmask-
ing of wizards and revealing of danger stemmed 
from the contact which dreams provide with the 
dead: “The dream is a revelation coming from 
the unseen world” (p. 109). He went on to de-
scribe how when dreams and omens do not ap-
pear spontaneously, the “primitive” will employ 
more active forms of divination. “To calculate 
the chances carefully and systematically, and try 
to think out what will happen, and make plans 
accordingly, is hardly the way in which primitive 
mentality proceeds” (p. 159). Instead, divination 
is their tool of choice.
After concluding that primitive people have 
no concepts, no true ideas, no sense of self or so-
ciety, no definite conception of reality, and fail 
to recognize the basic laws of logic, Lévy-Bruhl 
did at least acknowledge that difficulties face any 
researcher trying to grasp another way of living 
in the world: 
In spite of the most careful effort, our thought 
cannot assimilate them [the paths of primitive 
thought] with what it knows as its “ordinary” 
1  “Kaffir” has become a pejorative term in Africa today, 
especially in South Africa, in large part because it origi-
nated in the Arabic term for unbeliever. It is a term used 
in the Koran in the same way. But until the early 20th 
century it was used to refer to natives of Southern Afri-
ca, often specifically to the Xhosa people. It is the term 
that Lévy-Bruhl used to refer to the natives of South 
Africa.358
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objects. It therefore despoils them of what there 
is in them that is elementally concrete, emotio-
nal, and vital. This it is which renders so difficult, 
and so frequently uncertain, the comprehension 
of institutions wherein is expressed the mentali-
ty, mystic rather than logical, or primitive people 
(p. 447).
Lévy-Bruhl genuinely seemed to want to 
explore primitive mentality objectively, without 
presumptions, especially avoiding the presump-
tion that such people ought to think the way 
Westerners do. Primitive mentality was not to be 
considered an early form of Occidental, reason-
able, mentality; it was fundamentally distinct, 
essentially other. He concluded (1910/1925) that 
such people did not lack the capacity to think 
abstractly and logically, they simply lacked the 
custom and habit to do so. 
Much anthropological research since Lévy-
Bruhl’s time has continued to presume that 
divination is inherently irrational. For example, 
in a much-cited article, Moore argued that the 
function of divination is merely to introduce 
what is essentially a randomization mechanism 
to disrupt customary practices that have become 
ineffective (as a result of failure-due-to-success 
effects, such as hunting out an area, or hunting 
to the point that the remaining animals become 
wary and hard to catch). This is to say that divi-
nation functions precisely because it cannot pre-
dict the future (Moore, 1957). 
Similarly, Evans-Pritchard (1937) famously 
asserted that Azande divination involves a self-
limiting system for explaining away its failures. 
Zeitlyn (1990) drew a parallel between the ques-
tioning in a session of divination and an early 
experiment by Garfinkel in which the researcher 
responded to a participant’s questions by throw-
ing a dice. Garfinkel’s conclusion was that people 
can always find meaning in random events, and 
Zeitlyn argued that this is precisely what hap-
pens in divination.
Anthropologists have often complained 
that the diviner fails to “go behind” his beliefs 
and recognize them as symbols of psychological 
or social forces: “He treats as self-evident truths 
what social anthropologists and depth psychol-
ogists would try to reduce to rational terms” 
(Turner, 1961, p. 231). Divination is assumed to 
symbolize some deeper rationality, which it is the 
job of the anthropologist to uncover. The diviner 
confuses appearance and reality; the anthropol-
ogist can, and must, set these straight.
However, in making such claims it would 
appear that the anthropologist is just as guilty as 
the diviner of failing to permit any falsification 
of their own worldview. If the diviner does not 
allow any test of the existence of spirits, neither 
does the anthropologist. The former simply ac-
cepts that they exist; the latter simply accepts that 
they do not. The diviner interprets the signs of 
the oracle as evidence for a deeper, hidden orga-
nization. The anthropologist does the same! Both 
are guilty of what Garfinkel has called the “docu-
mentary method of interpretation,” where an ev-
eryday phenomenon is taken to document some 
kind of hidden structure, for which the phenom-
enon is taken to be evidence, and the structure 
is then appealed to as an “explanation” of the 
phenomenon. Instead, Garfinkel (1996) recom-
mends, we should be looking at the ways the or-
ganization of everyday phenomena is achieved. 
What is needed is a method of investigation 
which does not try to replace the local, vernacu-
lar, indigenous ontology with either a Western or 
an academic conception of social reality.
The crux of the matter is that the diviners’ 
claims are incommensurate with those of 
anthropologists. The anthropological response 
to this problem often consists of reducing the 
diviners’ statements to phenomena that the 
diviners make no pretension to address. This 
strategy has the advantage of neutralizing the 
diviners’ truth-claims whilst making them 
meaningful in terms of scientific criteria. The 359
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posited underlying “essence” provides the vo-
cabulary for translating one set of representa-
tions into another in accordance with classic 
epistemology… To justify this, anthropologists 
proclaim diviners, clients, and themselves as 
“imputing meanings” in order to make sense 
of behaviour that “is assumed to be connected 
to a hidden state of affairs”... Crucially, these di-
fferent actors do not disclose and relate to the 
same underlying reality (Myhre, 2006, p. 314).
In the analysis we report here, we have 
tried to avoid replacing the local ontology of the 
consultation with our own conception of real-
ity. However, the fact that a babalawo can live 
and practice divination successfully in the heart 
of a modern city such as Bogotá suggests that 
incommensurability is not the correct way to 
characterize the relationship between Santería 
and the reality of modern anthropology. We 
shall return to this point later.
Vygotsky on Divination
Rather surprisingly, in his notes on con-
crete psychology Vygotsky also wrote of the Kaf-
fir. Writing just a few years after the publication 
of Lévy-Bruhl’s work, he discussed the case of a 
judge who is also a husband as an example of 
how psychological “functions change the hierar-
chy in different spheres of social life” (Vygotsky, 
1986, p. 69) but then he also wrote of the psycho-
logical functions of the Kaffir, which, he argued, 
were not examples of “primitive” functioning: 
In him (the leader of the Kaffirs) sleep acquired 
a regulatory junction through the social signifi-
cance of dreams (unexplainable difficulty, etc., 
the beginnings of magic, cause and effect, ani-
mism, etc.): what he sees in his dreams, he will 
do. This is a reaction of a person, and not a pri-
mitive reaction (p. 65).
The divinatory dreaming of a Kaffir, then, 
far from being an illustration of the limitations 
of primitive mentality, as Lévy-Bruhl had seen 
it, was for Vygotsky an example of the “higher 
psychological functions,” because the Kaffir was 
dreaming deliberately, with control of his own 
abilities. The Kaffir’s dream was, then, an illus-
tration of a true personality. 
However, Vygotsky (1997) considered the 
Kaffir to still be primitive in another sense. He 
argued that although divination -tossing bones, 
for example- might be “the beginning of con-
scious self-control of one’s own actions,” (pp. 46-
47) it is only the beginning. Although “once an 
exceptionally important and significant moment 
in the system of behavior” (p. 47) it is, and was, 
nonetheless “rudimentary” (p. 47). He wrote:
[I]t is a fact that the man who first cast lots took     
an important and decisive step towards the de-
velopment of cultured behavior. This does not 
contradict the fact that such an operation kills 
any serious attempt to use reflection or expe-
rience in real life: Why bother to think and learn, 
when you can simply see what you dream, or roll 
the dice? Such is the fate of all forms of magical 
behavior: very soon they become an obstacle for 
the further development of ideas, though at one 
stage of the historical development of thinking 
they constitute the embryo of certain trends 
(Vygotsky, 1997, p. 47).
Vygotsky’s position here resembles that of 
Moore, who, as we noted earlier, argued that 
divination works precisely because it cannot 
predict the future. For Vygotsky, the Kaffir was 
a personality, employing higher psychological 
functions, but his divination through dreaming 
was still a long way from modern reasoning. It 
was merely a way of deciding what to do when 
there is no obvious basis for choice, a way of de-
ciding which precluded the use of reflection or 
experience.
The question we shall focus on in our analy-
sis, then, is whether divination necessarily “kills 
any serious attempt to use reflection or experience 
in real life” and whether it indeed stands opposed 
to any effort to “try to think out what will happen, 360
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and make plans accordingly.” Is “the mystical” 
inevitably opposed to “the logical”? Is divination 
just “magical behavior,” perhaps an “embryo” of 
the historical development of thinking but also an 
“obstacle” to such development? Or is it the case 
that, as Scribner (1977) noted, “We know very 
little about the social conditions which give rise 
to the logical genre, how cultures define the oc-
casions for its use, [or] through what experiences 
individuals acquire its schema” (p. 499).
Method
We have suggested that Vygotsky’s concrete 
psychology, like Foucault’s ontology of our-
selves, calls for an investigation of constitution, 
and we have proposed elsewhere that such an 
investigation requires that the traditional tools 
of ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, and the 
detailed study  of practical activity, are appropri-
ately reforged (for details, cf. Packer, 2010, 2011). 
Our study of the babalawo involved all three of 
these tools (Tibaduiza, 2010a, 2010b). The inves-
tigation was conducted by the second author, su-
pervised by the first author, in the city of Bogotá 
over a period of six months. Ethnographic field-
work was carried out, primarily in the houses 
of three babalawo, where they saw their clients. 
These houses were located in three different 
neighborhoods. A Cajon al Muerto (a spiritual 
ceremony to honor the dead) which took place 
in one of the houses was also attended. A consul-
tation was arranged with the first babalawo, then 
introductory interviews were scheduled with the 
others. A total of five interviews were conducted 
with the babalawo with whom the consultation 
was conducted, and two interviews with each of 
the others. All interviews were tape-recorded 
and transcribed, as was the consultation. Inter-
views were also conducted with three clients, 
two male, one female, in their places of work. 
The interviews focused on people’s motives for 
seeking a consultation. 
The following section describes what we 
learned about Santería and Ifá divination from 
the interviews, fieldwork, and background read-
ing. The subsequent section presents an analysis 
of the details of the consultation session. Our 
analytic approach here is that of conversation 
analysis (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Sacks, 
Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, 1995). 
Conversation analysis focuses on the pragmatics 
of conversation, and the practical and interac-
tive construction of conversational interchang-
es. It pays attention not so much to what people 
say as to what they do by saying. It also attends 
to the way participants in an interaction display 
their understanding of what they and others are 
doing, with sensitivity to the concrete setting of 
the interaction. We selected for detailed analysis 
one short excerpt (Transcript 1) from the con-
sultation, an excerpt that deals with a particu-
larly mundane matter, in part to avoid disclosing 
personal details, for much of the consultation 
dealt with very personal considerations. The 
features we will identify in this excerpt occurred 
throughout the consultation, however. 
santería
Santería is an Afro-Cuban religion whose 
formation began in the 16th century with the 
transportation of Yoruba slaves to Cuba. These 
people brought with them a set of beliefs based 
on the worship of the orishas (divinities in the 
Regla de Ocha, a Yoruba religion) (Clarke, 1939). 
The resemblance —at least superficially— of this 
tradition to the Catholicism which had also ar-
rived in the Americas facilitated a syncretic re-
lationship between these two religions, and this 
was reinforced by the restrictions that Catholic 
masters placed in their slaves (Bastide, 1969). 
Over time, a correspondence, part resignifica-
tion and part concealment, became established 
between Yoruba orishas and Catholic saints 
(Wedel, 2004). As a result, in Santería today the 
terms santo and orisha are used interchangeably. 
However, key differences remain, for example 
in rituals and in the conceptions of relation-
ship with ancestors, including the importance 361
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attributed to direct and two-way communica-
tion with the spiritual dimension, established in 
practices of trance-possession.
Santería practitioners believe in the exis-
tence of a supreme god along with a large num-
ber of subordinate deities to whom people can 
go to solve their problems and ask for help (Bar-
net, 2000; Wedel, 2004). This supreme divinity, 
which founded and governs the entire universe, 
consists of a trinity of Oloddumare, Olorun and 
Olofi. This has been compared to the Catholic 
trinity, however different interpretations exist. 
One of these is that Olofi is the supreme be-
ing, placed above all other creatures of creation, 
while Oloddumare is the sacred place where this 
divinity dwells, and where the spirits go when 
they have abandoned an earthly body. Olorun, 
the third aspect of the trinity, is the sun.
The orishas are divinities who overlook 
mankind; they once lived in the world and expe-
rienced the trials of daily life. Sacrifices are not 
made directly to the supreme being; it is through 
ceremonies, offerings and rituals to the orishas 
that humans discover what we need, and are 
taught how to live healthy, spiritual lives. 
In Santería, communication with the dead 
and the orishas is essential. Believers establish 
relations of guidance and reciprocity with them, 
and seek to know their wishes, advice, and 
warnings.  Consequently, an important form of 
interaction between the santos and practitioners 
of Santería is the consultation of oracles. There 
are three systems of divination and interpreta-
tion: obi, diloggún and Ifá. Our research focused 
on the oracle of Ifá, which is greatly respected 
and regarded by practitioners of Santería and by 
connoisseurs of the Yoruba tradition as the most 
comprehensive of the three, due to its great lit-
erary and symbolic content.  Ifá is consultation 
with Orula, one of the most important orishas. 
Ifá divination is based on a corpus of po-
etic narratives, comprised of many oddun, sets 
of proverbs, poems and stories that are the basis 
for interpreting the situation of the person who 
attends a consultation (García, 2000). These 
verses summarize thousands of years of accu-
mulated wisdom, and contain predictions and 
mundane and spiritual prescriptions (De Souza, 
2007). The Ifá divination system was in 2008 in-
scribed by UNESCO on its list of “Masterpieces 
of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Human-
ity” (UNESCO, 2008).
The experts who make use of this system of 
divination and interpretation are the babalawos. 
“The word babalawo in its etymological sense is 
derived from the Yoruba words: baba –father, 
la –have, awo –secrets, or the father who has the 
secrets” (Betancourt, 2007, p. 2). The babalawos 
play a highly important role in Santería, since 
they embody the collective spirit of the commu-
nity and are guardians of the secrets of the uni-
verse (Betancourt, 2007). The messages revealed 
through divination are the exclusive communi-
cation between Orula and the earthly world. It 
was Olofi, Oloddumare and Olorun who created 
the earth, but Orula is the only orisha who per-
mits direct communication between this earthly 
world and these figures of creation. As a result, 
he has, or is, the knowledge and intelligence that 
govern human beings and triumph over all evil. 
He is the divine and wise figure who knows the 
future of everyone and everything. It is Orula 
who is consulted through Ifá divination, and the 
babalawos are the managers of this connection 
(Wedel, 2004). 
As a consequence, babalawos have a privi-
leged place in the religious hierarchy. A babalawo 
will be consulted in cases of ill-health, impotence 
or sterility, and also before a child is born and 
again shortly after the birth, to ascertain the 
child’s guardian spirit. Traditionally, when the 
newborn is a boy, it is the babalawo who deter-
mines whether circumcision should be carried 
out immediately or at the age of eighteen, as is 
traditional. The babalawo also officiates “when 
a house is to be built, a field planted, a journey 
begun, a project undertaken, a marriage consid-
ered” (Wyllie, 1970, p. 53). Today, the motives for 362
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a consultation are more likely to be money trou-
bles, relationship problems, and so on. 
Learning to perform Ifá divination requires 
a long process of preparation and learning (De 
Souza, 2007). This begins once the individual 
has been consecrated as a babalawo. Unlike the 
education that takes place in schools and univer-
sities, in Santería the title is awarded first, and 
only then does the process of learning begin 
(Lorenzo, personal communication, March 20, 
2010). The babalawo is guided by their padrino 
(godfather), and learns in the company of other 
ahijados (godchildren). His path (all babalawos 
are male) is also guided by the book of Ifá, the 
secret text that contains knowledge about the 
universe, which he must commit to memory. 
Through participating in the various ceremonies 
and consultations organized by the padrinos to-
gether with other ahijados, using the book of Ifá, 
the expertize of a babalawo grows.  
A babalawo will draw on this expertize in 
the registro, the activity of consulting the Ifá sys-
tem of divination. During consultation with a 
client, the babalawo has the task of obtaining an 
odu, the sign which provides the basis for appro-
priate advice and instruction, by throwing the 
ékuele, the tool of divination, which is made of 
colored seeds threaded on a chain. The patterns 
formed when the chain is thrown define sixteen 
different signs, so that two throws generate 256 
combinations. This system of divination has at-
tracted scholarly attention in large part due to 
its binary organization, which reflects a cosmo-
vision based on a metaphysical dualism. Each 
sign has its own teaching, recorded in the sacred 
text. The babalawo must apply this teaching to 
the client’s specific case, taking into account the 
particularities of their situation. He offers the 
client a recital of the relevant portions of the 
text, including instructions for sacrifice, poetic 
incantations, and illustrative narratives. 
All this suggests that a babalawo is a per-
son of skill and responsibility, one who has mas-
tered a body of traditional learning and also the 
practical skills of consultation and divination. 
Consequently, it is of great interest to explore the 
psychological capabilities that such a person has 
developed and acquired in the course of their 
professional training, and this is what we set out 
to do. Of central interest to us was the particular 
and specific constellations of psychological ca-
pabilities that are needed to successfully use the 
system of Ifá divination.
The Practice of Divination
 “[T]here is a paucity of case-studies 
of Ifa in use” (Zeitlyn, 2001, p. 238)
Our focus in this paper is on the practice of 
divination, that is, the consultation itself: “The 
way in which adepts make a bridge between 
their own knowledge or intuitions about the cli-
ent and the meanings of the [oracle]” (Zeitlyn, 
2001, p. 230). This, if anywhere, is where the ba-
balawo makes evident his skills and expertize. It 
is also where he makes evident the good life of 
Ifá, as he gives advice to the client. 
The day of the consultation, Lorenzo2 was 
waiting in the area of Bogotá known as Galerías. 
Lorenzo was 27 years old, born in Cuba, where 
he was consecrated as a babalawo seven years 
earlier. He had studied at college, though his 
education was interrupted when he moved to 
Colombia four years previously. He obtained 
his income from his work as a babalawo, and he 
was now the padrino of several members of the 
Santería community in Bogotá. After introduc-
tions and an explanation of the research, Lo-
renzo led the way to a small room in his house, 
used exclusively for consultations, where his in-
struments were laid out, among small altars to 
the orishas. There he sat at a desk and, making 
use of the instruments, began a series of prayers 
or moyubas in Yoruba to start receiving mes-
sages or oddun. He permitted recording only of 
that part of the consulation which consisted of 
2  A pseudonym.363
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the delivery of messages from the orishas, his 
interpretation of their relevance, and occasion-
al questions that helped him in this objective. 
It is this phase of the consultation on which we 
base our observations in this paper.  
Analysis and Results
“The relationship of client and diviner 
makes dialogue central to any adequate ac-
count of divination.“ (Zeitlyn, 2001, p. 237).
We have selected for detailed analysis here 
one short excerpt from the session of divination 
(Transcript 1), which lasted a total of 90 min-
utes. Our discussion of this excerpt is organized 
in terms of a series of discursive features which 
are evident in it. We will describe the character 
of the turn organization, the presence and prag-
matics of reported speech, the way the babalawo 
(B) “reads” his client (C), and the orientation of 
their interaction towards the offering and re-
ceipt of advice. We then discuss in some detail 
Transcript 1  
Excerpt from the Consultation
90
91
B Let me ask a little question. You live in a aparte-studio... in an apartment, with
other people. What person wears your clothing?
92 C Yes. Sometimes my cousin or my sister uses them
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
B Orula says not to lend your clothes any more, because that is stealing your luck.
That the person who wears someone’s clothes steals their astral, steals their luck.
If not, make an observation yourself, of how your cousin lives and how you live.
She’s all happy, all content, and you’re not. That is how someone’s luck, stability, 
leaves them. Because [when] one lends their astral, although one washes it 100
times, it takes holds of the astral of the other person as well, and if it’s a negative
astral, it also includes one. We, the religious, don’t loan our clothing, we don’t
bathe with the same towel or the same soap. We don’t loan underwear, socks,
shoes, anything. Because that is one’s personal things and that takes hold of 
your astral. Nor wear the clothes of another person.
103 C [Indicates agreement]
104
105
106
B Orula says they speak the Eggun Obini, this is the head of the Eggun Obini. What
does this mean? It is like the king of the people who have died and are women.
Let me ask you a little question. Is your grandmother on your mother’s side alive?
the organization of argumentation behind the 
specific advice that is offered in this excerpt. 
Long turns, short replies
The first of the features of the interaction in 
this excerpt that becomes evident is the charac-
ter of its turn-taking organization (Sacks et al., 
1974). The organization of turns in this exchange, 
as in the consultation as a whole, is such that the 
client’s moves are “preallocated”: they take only 
a few forms, mainly responses to questions, and 
they are generally short. One might suppose, 
then, that the babalawo’s turns are largely devot-
ed to the asking of questions. But in fact, and in 
contrast to those of his client, his turns are much 
less restricted. He does ask questions, certainly, 
but he also gives advice, tells stories, draws in-
ferences, makes assertions. His turns are much 
longer than the client’s, and they are much less 
restricted than those of, say, a lawyer question-
ing a witness in a courtroom (where statements 
are not permitted).364
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In these respects the interaction resembles 
others that are characteristic of “institutional” 
discourse (such as news interviews, courtrooms, 
classrooms, doctors’ offices) in which one party 
questions the other, rather than “ordinary talk.” 
Institutional talk will “embody orientations 
which are specifically institutional or which are, 
at the least, responsive to constraints which are 
institutional in character or origin” (Heritage, 
1998, p. 6). Such talk generally has the following 
characteristics: the interaction involves goals tied 
to institution-relevant identities; it involves spe-
cial constraints on what is an allowable contri-
bution; it will involve special inferences that are 
particular to specific contexts (Heritage, 2005). 
We see each of these characteristics in the 
consultation and, indeed, in this excerpt. We 
have already mentioned the differential con-
straints on the moves made by the two partici-
pants, babalawo and client, which are clearly 
visible in the different lengths of the turns, and 
the question-answer alternation. Later we will 
focus in detail on the “special inferences” that 
are being made. That leaves the institution-rel-
evant identities: in terms of these we can see the 
babalawo characterizing his own identity -“we, 
the religious”- in order to articulate the goal of 
maintaining ones “astral” in the face of attempts 
by others to “take hold” of it or “steal” it. He also 
characterizes his interlocutor as recipient of ad-
vice. The interaction as a whole can be seen as 
one in which the goal of the babalawo is to diag-
nose and offer advice, while that of the client is 
to obtain guidance. 
Several domains of interactional phenom-
ena are considered relevant to institutional 
interaction (Drew & Heritage, 1992; Heritage, 
1998): turn-taking organization, overall struc-
tural organization of the interaction, sequence 
organization, turn design, lexical choice, and 
epistemological and other forms of asymme-
try. In addition to the strikingly asymmetric 
turn-taking, topic control in the consultation is 
managed entirely by the babalawo. Turn design 
is largely in his hands; it is he who closes the 
interaction, for example. It is he who shifts the 
topic from reading the signs, to telling the for-
tune, to determining the offerings to be made. 
The terminology is specific to Ifá. And the epis-
temology is indeed asymmetrical: it is he who 
knows. Below we explore in more detail how he 
works to display his knowledge.
reported speech
One might assume that the divination is 
an interaction between two participants, the ba-
balawo and the client, but in actuality there is a 
three-way conversation. It is indeed the case that 
“In examining the process of divination, we must 
consider the multivalent and hence multivocal 
relationship between divination technique and 
diviner as well as between diviner and client” 
(Zeitlyn, 2001, p. 237). This three-way character 
is evident in the frequent appearance of reported 
speech. “Reported speech is speech within speech, 
utterances within utterances, and at the same time 
also speech about speech, utterances about utter-
ances” (Voloshinov, 1929, p. 115). We observe many 
utterances in which the babalawo speaks for, or on 
behalf of, another person, generally one of the od-
dun. For example, in this excerpt he says, “Orula 
says not to lend your clothes any more.” 
The use of reported speech conveys that 
the babalawo is a relayer of information, not 
its source. What we generally see, and what we 
see here, is not quoted speech, but speech that 
is glossed. The babalawo does not say “Orula 
said, ‘Call your mother’,” but “Orule said that 
you should call your mother.” The distinction 
may seem small, but it is significant. It is what 
Voloshinov (1929) refers to as a transposition 
from “the sphere of speech construction to the 
thematic level” (p. 116). The glossed speech is 
still detectable as a “foreign” element, as a con-
tribution from a third party, which the babalawo 
relays. At the same time, in glossing rather than 
quoting, the babalawo displays himself as actively 
reporting the source’s speech or message. 365
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Reported speech is treated by both speaker 
and recipient as belonging to a third party. This 
treatment lends weight to the supposition that 
the third party actually exists, albeit in a distinct 
existential modality (fictional, or dead, or tran-
scendental). The reporting of the oddun, and me-
diatedly of Orula, also demonstrably takes into 
account the client as third-person recipient. The 
report is evidently designed for her reception. 
In the excerpt, what Orula is reported as saying 
is put in the second person: “not to lend your 
clothes,” not “one should not lend one’s clothes.” 
A distinction has been drawn between two 
attitudes to the boundary markers between au-
thorial and reported speech, and between two 
corresponding analytical strategies (Clark & 
Holquist, 1984). The first attitude is “linear.” It at-
tempts to maintain the integrity and authenticity 
of the reported speech, and places clear, hard-
edged boundaries between it and the authorial 
speech. (This is what we do when we quote from 
the transcript.) The strategy here is that of em-
phasizing reference. Meaning is dissected into 
constituent, ideational referential units, and em-
phasis is placed on the meaning of the utterance, 
not matters such as its style.
The second attitude is “pictorial.” This ap-
proach infiltrates the reported speech with edi-
torial retort and commentary. It dissolves and 
obliterates the boundaries between the two. The 
strategy here is that of emphasizing texture; this 
approach particularizes the reported words, but 
shades them with the author’s attitude. What we 
see in the case of the babalawo’s reported speech 
is this second strategy. As a consequence, in oc-
casions of reported speech the babalawo gener-
ally displays his orientation to the message he is 
reporting, and his orientation to the oracle. 
There is also another kind of reported 
speech, though it does not occur in the excerpt 
we have selected here. This is when the babalawo 
reports -or appears to report- speech by the 
other participant, the client. For example, at one 
point he says, “This Gypsy comes in the spiritual 
cord. What is this? This is part of a ring of astral 
protection.” The “What is this?” serves here as a 
turn taken on behalf of the client. One conse-
quence is that although, as described above, the 
client’s turns are largely preallocated as replies 
to questions, with this device the babalawo ef-
fectively raises questions on the client’s behalf. 
In doing so, he voices her unspoken doubts and 
uncertainties. The effect of this “ventriloquism” 
is to imply, to create the impression, that he can 
anticipate her queries, her confusion or skep-
ticism -or, to put it another way, that he can 
read her mind. This kind of reported speech 
displays the babalawo’s reception of his client’s 
concerns. He displays his sensitivity to issues 
that are unspoken. Indirect speech is “analytical 
transmission of someone’s speech”- “an analy-
sis simultaneous with and inseparable from 
transmission” (Voloshinov, 1929, p. 128). What 
was form, the emotive-affective features, must 
become content.
We see here that divination is not only about 
anticipating the future, it is also about intuiting, 
understanding, the past and the present. We wit-
ness in this characteristic of the discourse the 
display to the client of a preternatural -uncom-
mon, even unaccountable- understanding of 
her thoughts and feelings. This is also evident in 
the next characteristic feature of the interaction.
reading the client 
We have noted that many of the client’s 
turns are responses to questions, and it is strik-
ing that many of these questions are ones that 
would more usually follow a presequence. For 
example, the question “What person wears 
your clothing?” might be expected to follow a 
presequence such as “Does someone wear your 
clothing?” “Yes.” In other words, such questions 
presume a prior acquisition of information that 
has not in fact taken place. The babalawo’s ques-
tion presumes that someone has indeed been 
wearing the client’s clothes, and proceeds from 
there to inquire as to the identity of that person.   366
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Such questions without presequences appear re-
peatedly during the consultation.
In this excerpt we also see assertions which 
appear to rest upon prior knowledge of the cli-
ent which has not in fact been provided. The ba-
balawo begins with “You live in a aparte-studio... 
in an apartment, with other people.” The consul-
tation was our first contact with Lorenzo, and 
he had been told nothing of our living circum-
stances. Similarly, when he says “She’s all happy, 
all content…” this is also something that had not 
been talked about.
There are at least two ways of interpret-
ing such questions and assertions that presup-
pose prior interactional work that has not in 
fact been done. One is to see them as a strategy 
of “cold reading” the client. “‘Cold reading’ is 
a procedure by which a ‘reader’ is able to per-
suade a client, whom he has never before met, 
that he knows all about the client’s personality 
and problems” (Hyman, 1977, p. 2). Cold read-
ing can take the form of offering highly gen-
eral assertions that can fit any individual, or 
of asking questions which appear to presume 
prior knowledge. On the face of it this is a risky 
strategy, but if it pays off it provides handsome 
benefits, because the inference would be that 
the babalawo has knowledge that only the spir-
itually-informed could have.
The second way of interpreting these as-
sertions and questions is that the babalawo is 
reading the client in a different way: reading 
her demeanor, her attitude, attending carefully 
to such things as the state of her clothing, her 
facial expressions, the color of her skin, and so 
on. This would be to attribute to him a honed 
intuitive ability to attend to what is not explic-
itly spoken, and so is not evident in a transcript 
of the consultation. Certainly, in either case, the 
effect of such questions and assertions is to dis-
play knowledge of the client that has a somewhat 
mysterious quality; an intuitive understanding 
of the client’s past and present circumstances 
and concerns.
oriented towards Advice 
Much of the babalawo’s talk takes the form 
of advice, recommendations, and obligations for 
the future conduct of the client. What she has 
to do, or ought to do, includes “go to the church 
and make mass for you deceased relatives,” “look 
after your mother, by phone,” “arrange a sacri-
fice,” “pray,” “wear your hair loose,” and so on. In 
the excerpt we are focusing on, the advice is to 
stop lending her clothes.
It is worth considering in detail the way this 
advice is offered. In the terminology of Toulmin, 
Rieke and Janik’s (1974) analysis of argument, 
the central claim is “not to lend your clothes any 
more” (Line 93). Backing is offered in the form of 
an appeal (through reported speech) to the au-
thority of Orula (“Orula says…” (Line 93)), and 
immediately a warrant is added: “because that 
is stealing your luck” (we have translated suerte 
as “luck,” but it could equally be “fate”). This 
warrant is then clarified in the form of a further 
claim: “The person who wears someone’s clothes 
steals their astral, steals their luck” (Line 94). 
The babalawo then recommends to the client 
that she make her own observation; if she does 
so, she will see that her cousin who, he asserts, 
on occasion uses her clothes, is happy, content, 
while she, the client, is not (Lines 95-96). This is 
presented as empirical backing that supports the 
warrant for Orula’s claim: due to the fact that her 
cousin has worn her clothes, the client’s astral 
has been stolen. The consequence of this is that 
the client is unhappy, while her cousin is happy. 
It also counters a possible rebuttal: the “If not…” 
can be glossed as “If you don’t believe what I 
am telling you, consider this….” The babalawo 
then provides a qualification: “because…” even 
though one might wash ones clothes a hundred 
times, the astral of the person who wore them 
cannot be removed (Lines 97-99). This serves to 
counter a possible rebuttal that the loss of one’s 
astral might be prevented by the simple expedi-
ent of washing the clothes that have been bor-
rowed. Then he adds what could be taken as 367
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further backing to the validity of the warrant 
underlying the central claim, in the form of an 
appeal to his authority, or a confirmation that he 
himself lives by the advice he is offering to her 
(and so a qualification to an anticipated rebuttal 
that the claim should also apply to him): “We, 
the religious, don’t loan our clothing…” (Line 
99). Nor do they do the reciprocal: they don’t 
“wear the clothes of another person” (Line 102), 
this countering the possible rebuttal that if the 
effect works one way, it ought to work in the op-
posite direction. He adds a further qualification; 
not only clothing should not be shared, but also 
shoes, towels, soap (Line 100).
Discussion
We have seen that the consultation was an 
interaction with characteristics of institutional 
discourse. If the consultation was an institution, 
we would expect to find in it evidence of “insti-
tutional facts,” of occasions where “X counts as 
Y” (Searle, 2006). Every institution defines its 
own reality, and those who enter have to grasp 
it. In the excerpt that we have analyzed, one clear 
example of an institutional fact is the astral. This 
entity is part of a local ontology, the ontology of 
Ifá divination, which, not surprisingly, is distinct 
from that of, for example, Western science. The 
ontology is established on the basis of evidence 
that is “documentary” in Garfinkel’s sense: The 
loss of an astral is documented by the unhappi-
ness and ill-health of its owner, for example.
Within this unfamiliar ontology, the episte-
mology —the reasoning and argument— has fea-
tures that we can nonetheless recognize: Logical 
inference; appeal to empirical observation; de-
feasible claims. Lévy-Bruhl (1922/1923) suggested 
that the primitive would turn to divination, be-
cause “[t]o calculate the chances carefully and 
systematically, and try to think out what will hap-
pen, and make plans accordingly, is hardly the way 
in which primitive mentality proceeds” (p. 159). 
He saw divination as an alternative to careful 
thinking. Yet we have seen that the babalawo 
incites his client to think carefully about what 
will happen if she does not change her conduct, 
and to anticipate what might happen if she does. 
He invites her to make plans accordingly. Lévy-
Bruhl (1910/1925) insisted that there is no place 
in primitive mentality for reasoning, or even for 
reasons: “The mind of the ‘primitive’ has hardly 
any room for such questions as ‘how’ or ‘why?’” 
(p. 25). However, we have seen that the babalawo, 
explaining to his client what she must do, makes 
detailed and careful use of considerations of how 
and why. He explains why one must not share 
one’s clothing. He provides a detailed explana-
tion, one that is rational insofar as the claim is 
clearly stated, it appeals to empirical data, it is 
grounded in warrants, and it is given backing. 
The passage, then, has a complex argumen-
tative organization. The argument is a power-
ful one, however, not simply in consequence of 
its form. In addition, and despite its seemingly 
mundane topic, it deals with powerful and im-
portant issues, ones which Vygotsky also recog-
nized. Central to his account of ontogenesis is 
the claim that the child is not an individual who 
needs to be socialized, but a thoroughly social 
being who needs to be individualized (Vygotsky, 
1987). The advice to stop sharing one’s clothes 
is, on a small scale, a recommendation to asset 
one’s individuality, to become increasingly dif-
ferentiated, increasingly “self-ful.” Vygotsky also 
emphasized that human freedom consists in the 
recognition of necessity, and part of this neces-
sity is the fact that we cannot directly control our 
behavior or thought -we can do so only through 
mediation, through indirect means. The person 
who seeks consultation and divination needs ad-
vice regarding some difficult choice or decision 
in their life. They may face a choice between un-
palatable alternatives; they may simply not know 
what to do in the face of some problem or trou-
ble. They have lost the ability to freely choose. 
The essence of luck might be said to be having 
meaningful choices among what are seen to be 
viable courses of action. In the absence of such 368
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choices, a person’s luck has been stolen. Once 
meaningful choices become evident again, the 
person begins to have new powers and possibili-
ties. If someone close to us is taking advantage 
of us in a way that reduces our individuality 
and our ability to make choices, then follow-
ing Orula’s advice may indeed help us get our 
luck back. Starting to say “no” to those who take 
advantage of us can enable us to start making 
more important choices. In his extended turn at 
this point in the consultation (and elsewhere as 
well) the babalawo displays his understanding 
of the truly human nature of luck, of fate. His 
argument is potent because it is about people 
empowering themselves through active choices 
of their own making. This is the kind of infer-
ence that appears to characterize the divination 
as institution. 
Conclusions
“Wherever a theory of divination has been 
elicited directly from diviners in their native 
language, we find a clear recognition of induc-
tive, intuitive and interpretative techniques 
and ways of knowing” (Tedlock, 2001, p. 193).
In this article we have simply tried to study 
with some care and attention to detail the prac-
tice of divination, in order to see whether or not 
it suffered from the limitations and inadequacies 
that both Lévy-Bruhl and Vygotsky attributed 
to it. Neither of them witnessed divination first 
hand, as far as we can tell; they relied on oth-
ers’ reports of field work. On the basis of our 
analysis, we cannot accept the suggestion that 
divination works because it does not work –that 
it is no more than tossing an unbiased coin. Ifá 
divination is more than tossing shells; it is also 
the whole book of accumulated and condensed 
wisdom about how to live, plus the babalawo’s 
expertise in seeing what may be amiss in some-
one’s life. Perhaps the selection of a particular 
portion of the text is random (though an open 
mind is appropriate here), but whatever piece of 
wisdom it contains it likely to have some value. 
Far from determining the client’s course of ac-
tion —making the choice for her— the emphasis 
in this consultation seems to have been to en-
courage her to make her own thoughtful choices.
Vygotsky considered the divinatory dream-
ing of a Kaffir to be an example of the hierarchy 
among the higher psychological functions, but 
still a long way from modern reasoning. How-
ever, most modern Westerners today still live in 
a world of the unseen: of God, electrons, nuclear 
reactions, and much more. A select few —our 
wise men and women— have the ability to in-
fluence these and in a special way to see them. 
But for the rest of us they are mysterious enti-
ties that guide our destinies, or light our houses, 
or threaten our existence. Lest we assume that 
those of us in the Occidental world practice only 
scientific thinking, and that divination is to be 
found only in premodern societies, in backward, 
primitive cultures, remember that in May of 2011 
a large number of people in the United States 
were sufficiently convinced by Harold Camp-
ing’s prophesies of the end of the world that they 
sold their worldly goods in preparation for their 
transportation to the hereafter. And how many of 
us have purchased a lottery ticket based on our 
favorite number, or our birthdate? Or tried to 
predict the outcome of games of chance? “What 
is clear in most reports of North American games 
of chance is that the activity, even when it had 
crossed the line and become a pastime, was still 
heavily related to genuine forms of divination” 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Bennett, 1971, p. 47). And 
let us not forget that it was the illustrious Carl 
Jung (1950/1971) who wrote the introduction to 
the translation of the I Ching, the ancient Chi-
nese book of divination. Jung believed in what he 
called synchronicity, or meaningful coincidence, 
and there are Jungian analysts today who use 
Tarot cards as part of their clinical practice.
Furthermore, the reasoning that Lévy-
Bruhl judged irrational was being demonstrated 
in the context of interrogations by people who 369
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had colonized, oppressed, and often enslaved 
and killed those they were talking to. Bonfil 
(1987), writing of the treatment of indigenous 
peoples in the Americas, has noted how 
a system of cultural control was put into effect 
through which the decision-making capacities 
of the colonized peoples were limited. Their 
control over various cultural elements was pro-
gressively wrenched away, as it benefited the 
self-interest of the colonizers in each historical 
period (pp. 67-68). 
In such circumstances it would hardly be 
surprising if such peoples were to show little 
interest in the topics that Western researchers 
tried to get them to reason about. Psychologists 
sensitive to such effects have abandoned the use 
of standard tests and tasks for just these reasons 
(Cole, 1995).
In this article we have focused on an oc-
casion of Ifá divination because of the impor-
tance of seeing the capabilities of a babalawo in 
practice. We have identified several features of 
the interaction between client and babalawo: an 
institutional discourse with long turns and short 
replies; frequent reported speech, glossed rather 
than quoted, pictorial rather than linear; read-
ing the client, with assertions and questions that 
presume prior knowledge; predictions, prophe-
sies, and the giving of advice. The turn-taking is 
that of institutional discourse: The client’s turns 
are preallocated, while the babalawo’s turns are 
less restricted. The goals of the consultation and 
the institution-relevant identities of the par-
ticipants are evident here. The reported speech 
displays the babalawo’s reception of his client’s 
concerns and his sensitivity to issues that are as 
yet unspoken. Questions that appear to presume 
prior knowledge establish and maintain an at-
mosphere of mystique and expertize. Finally, 
advice is offered that is grounded in the specifics 
of the client’s situation and in the accumulated 
wisdom of the book of Ifá. 
We have proposed that this advice is offered 
in the form of reasoned argument, with clearly 
stated claims, warrants and grounding. If we are 
correct in this interpretation, divination appears 
not to preclude logical reasoning or empirical 
observation. Psychologists are inclined to view 
reasoning as a solitary and cognitive process. It 
can be, but reasoning can also be a social, con-
textualized activity. A babalawo does not simply 
consult the oracle and dictate a course of action. 
He must reason with the client, relating what is 
in the signs to events in her life, to her concerns 
and the reasons she chose to consult him in the 
first place. He must justify the course of action 
spoken by Orula, anticipate possible objections, 
and provide both logical and empirical ground-
ing for his claim about its worth. Our analysis 
suggests that the babalawo is guiding his client 
in what amounts to a process of constitution, of 
self-mastery. This divination consultation is an 
occasion of ontological work, of the social be-
coming individual, of techniques for care of the 
self. We have picked only the most mundane ep-
isode from this consultation, because much of it 
dealt with very personal matters. But even here, 
we can see sophisticated psychological abilities 
at work. It is difficult, if not impossible, to pick 
apart the different psychological functions, but 
surely memory for the text, perception of the cli-
ent’s character, attention to the details of the or-
acle, are all involved. And, surely, reasoning at a 
high level. It is impossible to say that this divina-
tion takes place with no attention to how or why. 
The babalawo recommends a new way for his 
client to see her situation and make new choices. 
The courses of action he proposes amount to in-
structions in how to be more healthy, more wise, 
more spiritual. How to be.
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